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Wireless Technology Comparison

802.1X
 IEEE 802.11 standard for authentication, which supports multiple authentication modes, including RADIUS, that can be used in wireless and wireline networks.
802.11i
 IEEE standards group effort that involves “fixing” perceived weakness in 802.1X and WEP (see below).
LEAP
Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol, which includes Cisco’s proprietary extensions to 802.1X to share authentication data between Cisco Aironet wireless LAN access points and the Cisco Secure Access Control Server.
PEAP
 Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol, which was developed by Microsoft, Cisco and RSA Security, is now an IETF draft standard. PEAP encrypts authentication data using a tunneling method.
TKIP
Temporal Key Integrity Protocol, which was developed by the IEEE 802.11i standards committee as a WEP improvement.
TTLS
 Tunneled Transport Layer Security, which was developed by Funk Software and Certicom, now is an IETF draft standard. It is an alternative to PEAP.
WEP
 Wired Equivalent Privacy, a wireless encryption standard, which was developed by the IEEE 802.11 standards committee.



Technology
 Max Tranmission Speed
 Security
 Availability of "cracking" tools
 Advantages
 Disadvantages
802.11a
 54 Mbps
 WEP-152, Static passwords, some implementations add 802.11x security capabilities into 11a
 Some freeware, Some commerical
 Faster tranmission speed than 802.11b
 Latency is much greater than wired networks.  Security can be circumvented with some skill.
802.11b
 11 Mbps
 WEP-40-128, Static passwords
 Mainstream, trivial to circumvent security. 40-bit or 128-bit encryption makes no difference to cracking time.
 Availability of equipment, cost
 Latency is much greater than wired networks.  Security is absolutely trival to compromise, and hackers are well versed at cracking these networks.
802.11g
 54 Mbps
 WEP, Static passwords
 Same as 802.11b - mainstream
 Backwards compatible with 802.11b
 Latency is much greater than wired networks. Security can be easily circumvented.
802.1X w/ LEAP & TKIP & MIC
 Authentication framework that can be used with other 802.11 implementations
 RC4, per user per packet dynamic keying, user authentication, mutual authentication of client and server via username/password challeng/response, strong message integrity checks
 Theoretical IV collision if base key is not rotated.  802.1x/EAP allows the base key to be rotated on a policy defined interval. No known encryption attacks. LEAP brute-force tool recently released.
 Good levels of security.
 Latency is much greater than wired networks. Cisco specific authentication solution.  Must be supported by 3rd parties on server side (Radius) and client side (OS drivers).
802.1X w/ EAP-TLS & TKIP & MIC
 Authentication framework that can be used with other 802.11 implementations
 RC4, per user per packet dynamic keying, user authentication, mutual authentication of client and server via certificates, strong message integrity checks
 Theoretical IV collision if base key is not rotated.  802.1x/EAP allows the base key to be rotated on a policy defined interval. No known encryption attacks.
 Good levels of security.


 Latency is much greater than wired networks. Client workstations must support 802.1x/EAP. Clients must have certificates.
802.1X w/ PEAP & TKIP & MIC
 Authentication framework that can be used with other 802.11 implementations
 RC4, per user per packet dynamic keying, user authentication, hybrid mutual authentication of client and server, strong message integrity checks
 Theoretical IV collision if base key is not rotated.  802.1x/EAP allows the base key to be rotated on a policy defined interval. No known encryption attacks.
 Good levels of security.


 Latency is much greater than wired networks. Client workstations must support 802.1x/EAP. Servers (Radius) must have certificates.  Access Point and client OS support in Fall (August) 2002.  Initial support via vendor OS EAP implementations
802.11i - (802.1x & EAP & AES)
 Proposed standard yet to be adopted across all IEEE wireless media (802.11a,b,g)
 AES encryption, stronger mutual authentication
 Proposed standard yet to be adopted
 Good levels of security.


 Latency is much greater than wired networks. Proposed standard yet to be adopted.
BlueTooth
 1 Mbps
 Very poor.
 N/A
 N/A
 Does not have the bandwidth to handle serious network application demands (slow).  Also fairly insecure.
HiperLAN
 54 Mbps
 Public key cryptography, others
 N/A
 Relatively fast.
 Latency is much greater than wired networks. European Standard, not mainstream. Expensive.
HomeRF SWAP
 2 Mbps
 N/A
 N/A
 N/A
 Latency is much greater than wired networks. Designed for home use only.  Relatively slow.
Reline Communications (Pre-standard 802.16)
 72Mbps
 64-bit proprietary
 None Known
 Very fast transmission speed.  5.8GHz range (less interferance)
 Proprietary encryption.  Bridging only - no client support

Wireless Tools

[http://www.securitystats.com]

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