Technology
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Max Tranmission Speed
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Security
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Availability of "cracking" tools
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Advantages
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Disadvantages
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802.11a
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54 Mbps
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WEP-152, Static passwords, some implementations
add 802.11x security capabilities into 11a
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Some freeware, Some commerical
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Faster tranmission speed than 802.11b
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Latency is much greater than wired networks.
Security can be circumvented with some skill.
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802.11b
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11 Mbps
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WEP-40-128, Static passwords
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Mainstream, trivial to circumvent security.
40-bit or 128-bit encryption makes no difference to cracking time.
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Availability of equipment, cost
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Latency is much greater than wired networks.
Security is absolutely trival to compromise, and hackers are well versed at
cracking these networks.
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802.11g
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54 Mbps
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WEP, Static passwords
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Same as 802.11b - mainstream
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Backwards compatible with 802.11b
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Latency is much greater than wired networks.
Security can be easily circumvented.
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802.1X w/ LEAP & TKIP & MIC
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Authentication framework that can be used with
other 802.11 implementations
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RC4, per user per packet dynamic keying, user
authentication, mutual authentication of client and server via username/password
challeng/response, strong message integrity checks
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Theoretical IV collision if base key is not
rotated. 802.1x/EAP allows the base key to be rotated on a policy defined
interval. No known encryption attacks. LEAP brute-force tool recently released.
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Good levels of security.
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Latency is much greater than wired networks.
Cisco specific authentication solution. Must be supported by 3rd parties
on server side (Radius) and client side (OS drivers).
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802.1X w/ EAP-TLS & TKIP & MIC
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Authentication framework that can be used with
other 802.11 implementations
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RC4, per user per packet dynamic keying, user
authentication, mutual authentication of client and server via certificates,
strong message integrity checks
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Theoretical IV collision if base key is not
rotated. 802.1x/EAP allows the base key to be rotated on a policy defined
interval. No known encryption attacks.
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Good levels of security.
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Latency is much greater than wired networks.
Client workstations must support 802.1x/EAP. Clients must have certificates.
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802.1X w/ PEAP & TKIP & MIC
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Authentication framework that can be used with
other 802.11 implementations
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RC4, per user per packet dynamic keying, user
authentication, hybrid mutual authentication of client and server, strong
message integrity checks
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Theoretical IV collision if base key is not
rotated. 802.1x/EAP allows the base key to be rotated on a policy defined
interval. No known encryption attacks.
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Good levels of security.
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Latency is much greater than wired networks.
Client workstations must support 802.1x/EAP. Servers (Radius) must have certificates.
Access Point and client OS support in Fall (August) 2002. Initial support
via vendor OS EAP implementations
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802.11i - (802.1x & EAP & AES)
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Proposed standard yet to be adopted across
all IEEE wireless media (802.11a,b,g)
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AES encryption, stronger mutual authentication
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Proposed standard yet to be adopted
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Good levels of security.
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Latency is much greater than wired networks.
Proposed standard yet to be adopted.
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BlueTooth
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1 Mbps
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Very poor.
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N/A
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N/A
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Does not have the bandwidth to handle serious
network application demands (slow). Also fairly insecure.
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HiperLAN
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54 Mbps
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Public key cryptography, others
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N/A
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Relatively fast.
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Latency is much greater than wired networks.
European Standard, not mainstream. Expensive.
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HomeRF SWAP
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2 Mbps
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N/A
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N/A
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N/A
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Latency is much greater than wired networks.
Designed for home use only. Relatively slow.
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Reline Communications
(Pre-standard 802.16)
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72Mbps
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64-bit proprietary
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None Known
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Very fast transmission speed. 5.8GHz
range (less interferance)
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Proprietary encryption. Bridging only
- no client support
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